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As he went ashore he saw a great throng; and he had compassion on them, and healed
their sick. When it was evening, the disciples came to him and said: “This is a lonely
place, and the day is now over; send the crowds away to go into the villages and buy
food for themselves.” Jesus said: “They need not go away; you give them something
to eat.” They said to him: “We have only five loaves here and two fish.” And he said:
“Bring them here to me.” Then he ordered the crowds to sit down on the grass; and
taking the five loaves and the two fish he looked up to heaven, and blessed, and broke
and gave the loaves to the disciples, and the disciples gave them to the crowds. And
they all ate and were satisfied. And they took up twelve baskets full of the broken
pieces left over. And those who ate were about five thousand men, besides women
and children.
Mt 14:14–21
Why does an article that is supposed to be about mathematics start with the feeding
of the five thousand?
In the nineteen twenties, two Polish mathematicians — Stefan Banach and Alfred
Tarski — proved a mathematical theorem which sounds a lot like the feeding of the five
thousand. In their honor, it is called the Banach–Tarski paradox ∗ . Consequences of the
Banach–Tarski paradox are, for example:
An orange can be chopped into a finite number of chunks, and these chunks
can then be put together again to yield two oranges, each of which has the
same size as the one that just went into pieces.
Another, even more bizarre consequence is:
A pea can be split into a finite number of pieces, and these pieces can then be
reassembled to yield a solid ball whose diameter is larger than the distance of
the Earth from the sun.
∗The theorem is proved in the article: S. Banach and A. Tarski, Sur la de´composition des ensembles
de points en parts respectivement congruents. Fund. Math. 6 (1924), 244–277. Look it up if you think
I’m making things up!
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More generally, whenever you have a three-dimensional body (with a few strings attached),
you can obtain any other such body by breaking the first one into pieces and the reassem-
bling the parts. To turn five loaves and two fish into enough food to feed a crowd of more
than five thousand, then just appears to be a minor exercise.
If you have read this far, your attitude will presumably one of the following:
• You are a fundamentalist Christian and are delighted to find that mathematics lends
support to your beliefs.
• You are a fundamentalist Christian and are infuriated of how mathematicians make
a mockery of your beliefs.
• You are not a fundamentalist Christian, but your belief in the absolute truth of
mathematical theorems is so strong that it makes you swallow the Banach–Tarski
paradox.
• You are a person who puts common sense above everthing else, so that you neither
take the feeding of the five thousand nor the Banach–Tarski paradox at face value.
If you fall into the first three categories, there is probably little incentive for you to read
any further. Otherwise, I guess, your attitude is best described as follows: You may
believe in story of the feeding of the five thousand, but not take it literally, and if you
hear of a mathematical theorem whose consequences are obviously nonsense, you tend to
think that the theorem is wrong.
Take an orange, a sharp knife, and a chopping block. Then chop the orange into pieces,
and try to form two globes of approximately the same size out of the orange chunks. If
the chunks are small enough, each of these two globes will bear reasonable resemblance to
a ball, but, of course, each of them has a volume which is only about half of that of the
orange you started with. Perhaps you just didn’t chop up the orange in the right way?
Give it another try. The result will be the same. You can try your luck on hundreds of
oranges: You will produce tons of orange pulp, but no corroboration of the Banach–Tarski
paradox. Doesn’t this show that the Banach–Tarski paradox is wrong?
The Banach–Tarski paradox is a so-called existence theorem: There is a way of splitting
up a pea such the pieces can be reassembled into, say, a life-sized statue of Stefan Banach.
The fact that you haven’t succeeded in finding such a way doesn’t mean that it doesn’t
exist: You just might not have found it yet. Let me clarify this with an example from
elementary arithmetic. A positive integer p is called prime if 1 and p itself are its only
divisors; for example, 2, 3, and 23 are prime, whereas 4 = 2 · 2 and 243 = 3 · 81 aren’t.
Already the ancient Greeks knew that every positive integer has a prime factorization: If
n is a positive integer, then there are prime numbers p1, . . . , pk such that n = p1 · · · · · pk.
For small n, such a prime factorization is easy to find: 6 = 2 · 3, 243 = 2 · 3 · 3 · 3 · 3,
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and 6785 = 5 · 23 · 59, for example. There is essentially only one way of finding a prime
factorization: trying. Already finding the prime factorization of 6785 — armed only with
pencil and paper — would have taken you some time. And now think of a large number,
I mean, really large:
7380563434803675764348389657688547618099805.
This is a perfectly nice positive integer, and the theorem tells you that it has a prime
factorization, but — please! — don’t waste hours, days, or even years of your life trying
to find it. You might think: What were computers invented for? It is easy to write a
little program that produces the prime factorization of an arbitrary positive integer (and it
may even produce one of 7380563434803675764348389657688547618099805 in a reasonable
amount of time). The avarage time, however, it takes such a program to find the prime
factorization of an integer n goes up dramatically as n gets large: For sufficiently large n,
even the fastest super-computer available today would — in avarage — require more time
to find the prime factorization of n than the universe already exists. So, although a prime
factorization of a positive integer always exists, it may be impossibly hard to find. In
fact, this is a good thing: It is at the heart of the public key codes that make credit card
transactions on the internet safe, for example. Now, think again of the Banach–Tarski
paradox: Just because you couldn’t put it to work in your kitchen (just as you couldn’t
find the prime factorization of some large integer), this doesn’t mean that the theorem is
false (or that this particular integer doesn’t have a prime factorization).
Let’s thus try to refute the Banach–Tarski paradox with the only tool that works
in mathematics: pure thought. What makes the Banach–Tarski paradox defy common
sense is that, apparently, the volume of something increases out of nowhere. You certainly
know a number of formulae to calculate the volumes of certain particular three-dimensional
bodies: If C is a cube whose edges have length l, then its volume V (C) is l3; if B is a
ball with radius r, then its volume V (B) is 4
3
pir3. But what’s the volume of an arbitrary
three-dimensional body? No matter how the volume of a concrete body is calculated, the
following are certainly true about the volumes of arbitrary, three-dimensional bodies:
(i) if the body B˜ is obtained from the body B simply by moving B in three-dimensional
space, then V (B˜) = V (B);
(ii) if B1, . . . , Bn are bodies in three-dimensional space, then the volume of their union
is less than or equal to the sum of their volumes, i.e.
V (B1 ∪ · · · ∪Bn) ≤ V (B1) + · · ·+ V (Bn).
(iii) if B1, . . . , Bn are bodies in three-dimensional space such that any two of them have
no point in common, then the volume of their union is the even equal to the sum of
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their volumes, i.e.
V (B1 ∪ · · · ∪Bn) = V (B1) + · · ·+ V (Bn).
So, let B be an arbitrary three-dimensional body, and let B1, . . . , Bn be subsets of B such
that any two of them have no point in common and B = B1 ∪ · · · ∪Bn. Now, move each
Bj in three-dimensional space, and obtain B˜1, . . . , B˜n. Finally, put the B˜j together and
obtain another body B˜ = B˜1 ∪ · · · ∪ B˜n. Then we have for the volumes of B and B˜:
V (B) = V (B1 ∪ · · · ∪Bn)
= V (B1) + · · ·+ V (Bn), by (iii),
= V (B˜1) + · · ·+ V (B˜n), by (i),
≥ V (B˜1 ∪ · · · ∪ B˜n), by (ii),
= V (B˜).
This means that the volume of B˜ must be less than or equal to the volume of B — it
can’t be larger. Banach and Tarski were wrong! Really?
Our refutation of Banach–Tarski seems to be picture perfect: All we needed were three
very basic properties of the volume of three-dimensional bodies. But was this really all?
Behind our argument, there was a hidden assumption: Every three-dimensional body has
a volume. If we give up that assumption, our argument suddenly collapses: If only one of
the bodies Bj has no volume, our whole chain of (in)equalities makes no longer sense. But
why shouldn’t every three-dimensional body have a volume? Isn’t that obvious? What is
indeed true is that every orange chunk you can possibly produce on your chopping block
has a volume. For this reason, you will never be able to use the Banach–Tarski paradox
to reduce your food bill. A consequence of the Banach–Tarski paradox is therefore: There
is a way of chopping up an orange, so that you can form, say, a gigantic pumpkin out of
the pieces — but you will never be able to do that yourself using a knife. What kind of
twisted logic can make anybody put up with that?
Perhaps, you are more willing to put up with the axiom of choice:
If you have a family of non-empty sets S, then there is a way to choose an
element x from each set S in that family.
That sounds plausible, doesn’t it? Just think of a finite number of non-empty sets
S1, . . . , Sn: Pick x1 from S1, then proceed to S2, and finally take xn from Sn. What
does the axiom of choice have to do with the Banach–Tarski paradox? As it turns out, a
whole lot: If the axiom of choice is true, then the Banach–Tarski paradox can be derived
from it, and, in particular, there must be three-dimensional bodies without volume. So,
the answer to the question of whether the Banach–Tarski paradox is true depends on
whether the axiom of choice is true.
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Certainly, the axiom of choice works for a finite number of non-empty sets S1, . . . , Sn.
Now think of a sequence S1, S2, . . . of non-empty sets. Again, pick x1 from S1, then x2
from S2, and just continue. You’ll never come to an end, but eventually you’ll produce
some element xn from each Sn. So, the axiom of choice is true in this case, too. But what
if we have a truly arbitrary family of sets? What if we have to deal with the family of
all non-empty subsets of the real line? It can be shown that this family of sets can’t be
written as a sequence of sets. How do we pick a real number from each set? There is no
algorithm that enables us to pick one element from one set, then to proceed to another
and to eventuall pick an element out of each of them. Nevertheless, the axiom of choice
still seems plausible: Each set S in our family is non-empty and therefore contains some
element x — why shouldn’t there be a way of choosing a particular element from each
such set?
I hope, I have convinced you that the axiom of choice is plausible. On the other hand,
it implies strange phenomena like the Banach–Tarski paradox. If it’s true we have to put
up with the mysterious duplication of oranges. If it’s false, then: Why? Please, don’t try
to prove or to refute the axiom of choice. You won’t succeed either way. The axiom of
choice is beyond proof or refutation: We can suppose that it’s true, or we may suppose
that it’s false. In other words: We have to believe in it or leave it. Most mathematicians
these days are believers in the axiom of choice for a simple reason: With the axiom of
choice they can prove useful theorems, most of which are much less baffling than the
Banach–Tarski paradox.
Are you disappointed? Instead of elevating the feeding of five thousand from a matter
of belief to a consequence of a bullet-proof mathematical theorem, the Banach–Tarski
paradox demands that you accept another article of faith — the axiom of choice — before
you can take the theorem for granted. After all, the Banach–Tarski paradox is not that
much removed from the feeding of the five thousand . . .
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